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In a zero-sum game, one person’s gain is another person’s loss. Some 
claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act present such zero-
sum circumstances in that easing the claimant’s religious burden 
increases someone else’s burden. This Commentary explores the effect of 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores on such zero-sum claims using a 
paradigmatic example: RFRA claims challenging the Bald and Golden 
Eagle Protection Act. This inquiry reveals that Hobby Lobby did not open 
the door for cases involving true zero-sum games, including those under 
the Eagle Act and some under the anti-discrimination laws. In such cases, 
granting the requested religious accommodation merely shifts the 
claimant’s burden onto a third party. RFRA provides for easing burdens, 
not transferring them to others. Hence, even after Hobby Lobby, such 
zero-sum claims should fail. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
No sooner did the Supreme Court decide in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., that the contraception coverage requirement in the Affordable 
Care Act violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
1
 than 
the debate about the breadth of the Court’s decision commenced.2 There is 
no doubt, however, that Hobby Lobby opened the door wider for RFRA 
claims.
3
 The Court broadened the availability of relief under RFRA by 
 
 
* Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law. 
 1. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
 2. See, e.g., Joey Fishkin, Hobby Lobby and the Politics of Recognition, BALKINIZATION (June 
30, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-and-politics-of-recognition.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/TR5N-BFRL; Ryan Grim, 8 Other Laws That Could Be Ignored Now That 
Christians Get to Pick and Choose, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2014, 3:42 AM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/religious-companies-opt-out-of-laws_n_5544582.html?ncid=txtlnkus 
aolp00000592, archived at http://perma.cc/6EBV-6X56; Amy Howe, Court Rules in Favor of for-
Profit Corporations, but How Broadly? In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2014, 5:17 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/court-rules-in-favor-of-for-profit-corporations-but-how-broadly-
in-plain-english/, archived at http://perma.cc/KLK4-9CWG; Brian Leiter, Shorter Hobby Lobby, 
BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL REPORTS (June 30, 2014), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/ 
2014/06/shorter-hobby-lobby.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7REL-YQLR. 
 3. Fishkin, supra note 2 (“The Court has opened a door here—one that the Court in 
Employment Division v. Smith wisely concluded was better left closed.”). But see Eugene Volokh, 
Prof. Michael McConnell (Stanford) on the Hobby Lobby Arguments, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2014), 











extending its coverage to a for-profit entity,
4
 deeming the religious burden 
“substantial” despite breaks in the causal chain between the regulatory 
requirement and the plaintiff’s religious beliefs,5 insisting that the 
government’s compelling interests relate specifically to the case at hand,6 
and suggesting that the government might be required to pay for less 
restrictive means of furthering its compelling interests.
7
 Hobby Lobby will 
be seen as an invitation to potential RFRA claimants. 
Some of the RFRA claims that will undoubtedly follow Hobby Lobby 
will involve zero-sum games. Game theorists define a zero-sum game as 
“an endeavor in which the net result is zero. For every gain by one side, 
there is a counterbalancing loss by the other.”8 Some RFRA claims present 
zero-sum games in that alleviating one person’s religious burden 
necessarily increases someone else’s burden. Accommodating an 
employer’s religious preference for hiring certain kinds of people, for 
example, necessarily deprives other people of jobs.  
How will Hobby Lobby affect RFRA cases involving zero-sum 
games? I explore this question using a paradigmatic example of a zero-
sum RFRA claim: the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (The “Eagle 
Act”). The Eagle Act criminalizes the taking and possession of eagles 
without a permit.
9
 Because eagles are required for some Native American 
religious ceremonies, Congress carved out an exemption from the Eagle 
Act for federally recognized Indian tribes.
10
 Such tribal preferences are 
upheld as political classifications based on the federal government’s 
unique government-to-government relationship with recognized tribes.
11
 




stanford-on-the-hobby-lobby-arguments/, archived at http://perma.cc/DLR4-YRTU (“[I]f, as Justice 
Kagan suggested, a stringent interpretation of RFRA would bring religious objectors ‘out of the 
woodwork,’ we would have seen that after the Court’s stringent, unanimous ruling in O Centro eight 
years ago. But we haven’t.”). 
 4. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775. 
 5. Id. at 2777–79. 
 6. Id. at 2780. 
 7. Id. at 2781. 
 8. Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33, 46 
(2001)); see also Winton E. Williams, Resolving the Creditor’s Dilemma: An Elementary Game-
Theoretic Analysis of the Causes and Cures of Counterproductive Practices in the Collection of 
Consumer Debt, 48 FLA. L. REV. 607, 632 (1996) (“In the zero-sum game, the winnings of one player 
are the losses of another, so that the algebraic sum of the payoffs to each player always equals zero.”). 
 9. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2012). 
 10. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Eagles, Indian Tribes, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 47 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 53, 63 (2013). 














 Thus, accommodating one person’s religious 
exercise by permitting him to possess an eagle necessarily burdens 
someone else’s religious exercise by denying her access to that eagle. 
People who are not members of recognized tribes, but who need eagles for 
their religious practices, have challenged the Eagle Act under RFRA. 
Those claims have not succeeded, in part because alleviating such a 
claimant’s religious burden actually shifts the religious burden from the 
claimant to a tribal member.
13
 It’s quintessentially a zero-sum game. 
The Eagle Act example highlights a critical limitation of Hobby 
Lobby: it did not involve zero-sum circumstances. The government and 
law professors appearing as amicus curiae argued in Hobby Lobby that 
exempting the company from the contraception coverage requirement 
would impermissibly shift a burden onto the company’s female 
employees.
14
 They saw the case as a zero-sum game. The majority of the 
Court disagreed, holding that, if Hobby Lobby’s religious burden were 
alleviated, the burden on its female employees would be “precisely 
zero.”15 According to the Court, Hobby Lobby was not a zero-sum game. 
Thus, Hobby Lobby did not open the door for RFRA challenges posing 
zero-sum games.  
That is certainly true of RFRA claims under the Eagle Act in which 
religion weighs on both sides of the scale. It should be true in any case that 
presents true zero-sum circumstances, even if the balance is between 
religious and secular burdens. If the government is involved in allocating a 
limited resource such that the religious burden eased is equal to the secular 
burden imposed, granting the requested religious accommodation simply 
shifts the burden to a third party. RFRA provides for easing religious 
burdens, not shifting those burdens onto others. Thus, even after Hobby 
Lobby, all such claims should fail. 
II. HOBBY LOBBY 
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court departed from its 
prior strict-scrutiny test, holding that neutral laws of general applicability 
need not be supported by a compelling governmental interest to survive 
 
 
 12. Id. at 72, 74–76. 
 13. The Fifth Circuit recently relied on Hobby Lobby in holding that the United States did not 
meet its burden of proving that the Eagle Act satisfies RFRA, but that decision was interlocutory. 
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, No. 13-40326, 2014 WL 4099141 (5th Cir. Aug. 20, 
2014) (remanding for further proceedings). 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 27–33. 
 15. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014).  











challenge under the Free Exercise Clause.
16
 Thus, the State of Oregon did 
not violate the First Amendment when it denied unemployment benefits to 
members of the Native American Church who were fired for engaging in 
an act that the State considered a crime: using peyote in a religious 
ceremony.
17
 Congress responded to that decision by enacting RFRA.
18
 
RFRA reestablished, as a matter of statutory law, the pre-Smith Free 
Exercise Clause test, which Congress believed provided a “workable test 
for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing 
prior governmental interests.”19 RFRA provides that the government may 
not “substantially burden” a person’s free exercise of religion, “even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability,” except if the 
government proves “that application of the burden to the person . . . (1) is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”20 




The plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby challenged a regulation issued under 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 that requires 
employers to provide health insurance coverage for contraception.
22
 
Hobby Lobby asserted that providing coverage for four particular kinds of 
contraception would violate the tenets of its owners’ religion.23 Its RFRA 
claim succeeded in the Tenth Circuit.
24
 A similar claim by Conestoga 
Wood Specialties failed in the Third Circuit,
25
 and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in both cases.
26
 
The government argued, among other things, that granting Hobby 
Lobby an exemption from the contraception coverage requirement would 
 
 
 16. 494 U.S. 872, 884–89 (1990). 
 17. Id. at 877–82. 
 18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)–(5), (b)(1). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5), (b)(1) (2012). The Supreme Court has interpreted RFRA, 
however, as providing “even broader protection for religious liberty than was available” pre-Smith. 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 n.3. Not only does RFRA require government actions that 
substantially burden religion to further a compelling government interest, but it also requires the 
government to further its interests using the least restrictive means. Id. 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a)–(b). 
 22. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct at 2762–63.  
 23. Id. at 2766. 
 24. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 25. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 724 
F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 26. Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (Mem.); Conestoga Wood 












harm its female employees by denying them the right to receive such 
services without cost.
27
 RFRA, the government said, “cannot properly be 
interpreted to require relief that would impose burdens on private third 
parties.”28 Indeed, the government suggested in a footnote that a religious 
accommodation might impose such a burden on third parties that it 
violates the Establishment Clause.
29
 
A group of law professors filed an amicus brief elaborating on that 
argument. “[S]hifting the costs of accommodating a religion from those 
who practice it to . . . identifiable and discrete third parties in the for-profit 
workplace,” they explained, violates the Establishment Clause.30 Thus, 
when the Court upheld RFRA’s progeny, the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, in Cutter v. Wilkinson, it remarked that 
“courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested 
accommodation may impose on non-beneficiaries.”31 Some religious 
accommodations impose no burdens on third parties; others distribute the 
burdens “among a large and indeterminate class.”32 Exempting Hobby 
Lobby from the contraception coverage requirement, in contrast, would 
“impose significant burdens on an identifiable group of persons,” namely 
Hobby Lobby’s female employees and their dependents who do not share 
the company’s religious beliefs, “by requiring them to pay for or forgo 
contraceptives that Hobby Lobby’s health plan would otherwise cover.”33 
Hobby Lobby won. Justice Alito wrote for a five-member majority. 
The Court first held that closely held, for-profit corporations are “persons” 
who may bring a claim under RFRA, at least where they are “owned and 
controlled by members of a single family.”34 Second, the Court held that 
the regulation at issue substantially burdened Hobby Lobby’s exercise of 
religion because it forced the company to choose either to violate its 
religious beliefs or face severe economic consequences.
35
 Third, the Court 
assumed that the regulation at issue furthers a compelling governmental 
 
 
 27. Brief for the Petitioners at 38, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Jan. 
10, 2014). 
 28. Id. at 41. 
 29. Id. at 39 n.9 (citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708–11 (1985)); see 
also Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 3, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Mar. 
12, 2014). 
 30. Brief for Amici Curiae Church-State Scholars Frederick Mark Gedicks et al. at 3–4, Sebelius 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2014). 
 31. 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (citing Caldor, 472 U.S. 703).  
 32. Brief for Amici Curiae Church-State Scholars, supra note 30, at 20.  
 33. Id. at 22. 
 34. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774–75 (2014). 
 35. Id. at 2775–76. 











interest in “guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged 
contraceptive methods.”36 Fourth and finally, the Court held that, since the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had already established 
an accommodation for religious nonprofits that object to the contraception 
coverage requirement, that accommodation had to be made available to 
Hobby Lobby as well.
37
 
The Court rejected the third-party burden argument, concluding that 
exempting Hobby Lobby from the contraception coverage requirement 
would impose no burden at all on its female employees and their 
dependents who do not share the company’s religious beliefs. Hobby 
Lobby’s female employees could obtain contraception coverage without 




III. THE ZERO-SUM GAME  
A. Burden-Shifting Claims 
In a zero-sum game, “everything gained by one player must have been 
lost by the other.”39 Some claims for religious accommodations set up 
zero-sum games; they concern “not only the relationship between the state 
and the objector, but also a variety of conflicts and relationships between 
 
 
 36. Id. at 2780. 
 37. Id. at 2782–83. The least restrictive means analysis in Hobby Lobby is similar to the Court’s 
analysis in Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). The 
Court there held that, because the government had long exempted Native American religious use of 
peyote from the strictures of the Controlled Substances Act, it had to extend the same accommodation 
to members of an Amazonian religious sect who use a hallucinogenic tea for religious purposes. Id. at 
423. See also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“RFRA is inconsistent with 
the insistence of an agency such as HHS on distinguishing between different religious believers—
burdening one while accommodating the other—when it may treat both equally by offering both of 
them the same accommodation.”). 
 38. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782–83; see also id. at 2781 n.37 (“[O]ur decision in these cases 
need not result in any detrimental effect on any third party.”). Several days later, the Court issued an 
injunction pending appeal in Wheaton College’s RFRA suit challenging the form HHS required it to 
submit to participate in the exemption process for nonprofit religious institutions. The College 
believed that submitting the form would violate its religious beliefs. When it enjoined HHS from 
requiring Wheaton College to file that form, the majority emphasized that its order would not prevent 
the college’s employees and students from obtaining cost-free contraception. Wheaton College v. 
Burwell, No. 13A1284 (U.S. July 3, 2014) (order on application for injunction). Thus, like Hobby 
Lobby, the majority did not see Wheaton College as presenting a zero-sum game. 
 39. David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. 












the religious objectors and other rights holders.”40 For example, giving 
employees an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath imposes costs on 
employers and other employees.
41
 A sales tax exemption for religious 
newspapers and magazines increases the sales tax burden on secular 
newspapers and magazines.
42
 Exempting an employer from paying Social 
Security taxes for its employees disadvantages those employees.
43
 
Relieving religious nonprofits from the obligation to pay their employees 
minimum wage when working in for-profit activities “would give it a 
competitive advantage over secular businesses competing in the same 
markets, and ‘exert a general downward pressure on wages’ paid to 
employees in such businesses.”44 In each of these pre-RFRA First 




As Michael McConnell points out, however, there is nothing wrong in 
principle with shifting burdens.
46
 “[T]he government shifts economic 
burdens all the time,” and “[r]eligious accommodations often impose 
burdens on third parties.”47 To animate Establishment Clause concerns, the 
burden a religious accommodation imposes on third parties must be 
“substantial” or “significant.”48 It is not sufficient for a preexisting burden 
to be marginally increased. For example, when religious pacifists were 
 
 
 40. Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is a Burden: Protecting “Third Parties” in Religious 
Accommodation Law, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 433, 437 (2014).  
 41. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985). 
 42. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15, 18 n.8 (1989). 
 43. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
 44. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the 
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 343, 359 (2014) (discussing and quoting Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 
471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985)). 
 45. See Gedicks, supra note 44, at 357–59 (referring to burden-shifting as a “negative 
externality”). 
 46. Volokh, supra note 3. 
 47. Id.; Loewentheil, supra note 40, at 465 (“[T]here are always effects on other parties. The 
question is which effects we should take into consideration.”); Michael W. McConnell, 
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 
704 (1992) (“[L]egislatures adjust the benefits and burdens of economic life among the citizens” and 
“should have as much latitude to protect the exercise of religion that [they have] to protect other 
important values in life.”). 
 48. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985); see also Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014) (“[I]t could not reasonably be maintained that 
any burden on religious exercise, no matter how onerous and no matter how readily the government 
interest could be achieved through alternative means, is permissible under RFRA so long as the 
relevant legal obligation requires the religious adherent to confer a benefit on third parties.”); cf. 
McConnell, supra note 47, at 703 (suggesting that proper analysis focuses not on the “absolute 
magnitude” of the burden, but rather the proportionality between the burden alleviated and the burden 
imposed). 











exempted from the draft, the risk that secular pacifists would be drafted 
increased, but that was acceptable to the Supreme Court.
49
 Similarly, if the 
third-party burden is “widely distributed among a large and indeterminate 
class,” such as when churches are exempted from property taxes thus 




B. The Eagle Act 
RFRA claims under the Eagle Act provide a paradigmatic example of 
the zero-sum game. The Eagle Act prohibits, among other things, the 
taking, possession, and sale of eagles and eagle parts, except as permitted 
by the Secretary of the Interior.
51
 So long as the Secretary finds it 
compatible with the preservation of the species, she may permit the taking, 
possession, and transportation of eagles for “scientific or exhibition 
purposes of public museums, scientific societies, and zoological parks, or 
. . . for the protection of wildlife or of agricultural or other interests in any 
particular locality.”52  
The original Eagle Act protected only bald eagles. When Congress 
extended the Act to protect the golden eagle in 1962, it recognized that 
eagles hold religious significance for many Indian tribes.
53
 Accordingly, it 
authorized the Secretary to issue permits “for the religious purposes of 
Indian tribes.”54 The Department of the Interior interprets that provision as 
applying to federally recognized Indian tribes, consistent with the federal 
 
 
 49. Gedicks, supra note 44, at 363–64 (internal citations omitted). 
 50. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for 
Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 56 (2014). 
Some cases also present a “baseline” problem. Hobby Lobby argued that exempting it from the 
contraception coverage requirement would not cause its female employees any legally cognizable 
harm, because “nobody is lawfully entitled to a ‘benefit’ from a regulatory scheme that violates 
RFRA.” Brief for Respondents at 54, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Feb. 10, 
2014). A group of Constitutional Law professors filed an amicus brief elaborating on that argument: 
“Where a religious accommodation would allegedly burden third party rights that were created by the 
statute that burdens religious exercise, we might ask which came first – the burden on religion, or the 
rights that the accommodation allegedly burdens?” Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars at 18, 
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2014); see also Brief of National 
Association of Evangelicals at 7, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Jan. 27, 
2014); Volokh, supra note 3; Eugene Volokh, Would Granting an Exemption from the Employer 
Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 4, 2013, 5:11 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/12/04/3b-granting-exemption-employer-mandate-violate-establishment-
clause/, archived at http://perma.cc/PQ33-9TC6. Eagle Act cases present no such baseline problem. 
 51. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a). 
 52. 16 U.S.C. § 668a. 
 53. H.R. REP. NO. 87-1450, at 2 (1962); S. REP. NO. 87-1986, at 3–4 (1962). 












government’s unique government-to-government relationship with and 
fiduciary obligations to those tribes,
55
 and the courts have upheld the 
“Indian tribes” exception as a permissible political classification.56 The 
courts have recognized that the Eagle Act requires the government to 
balance its compelling interest in protecting eagles against its compelling 
interest in fulfilling the needs of recognized tribes and have held that it 
does so using the means that are least restrictive of religion.
57
 
Under the “Indian tribes” exception, the Secretary issues permits 
authorizing members of federally recognized Indian tribes to take eagles.
58
 
She also issues tribal members permits to possess eagles. Because the 
government has a policy of not prosecuting tribal members for possession 
of eagles or eagle parts, however, they actually don’t need possession 
permits. Applications for such permits are treated as requests to obtain 
eagles or eagle parts from the National Eagle Repository, which receives 
dead eagles from around the country and distributes them to tribal 
members “on a first-come, first-served basis.”59 
The religious demand for eagles is significant. Some people who 
practice Native American religions consider the eagle a messenger to the 
spirit world. Religious traditions involve either taking a live eagle or 
simply gathering molted feathers, then using the feathers and other parts 
for religious ceremonies like the annual Sun Dance, graduations, 
weddings, and funerals.
60
 The number of tribal members is growing, and 
the proportion of tribal members who practice Native American religions 
may be increasing as well.
61
 In addition, millions of other people claim 
some Native American ancestry.
62
 There’s no way to know how many of 
those people practice Native American religions, but the Tenth Circuit 
thought it safe to assume that the proportion is “non-trivial.”63 Add to that 
the unknown number of people who have no Native American ancestry, 
but practice Native American religions, and the roughly one million 






 55. Kovacs, supra note 10, at 107–8. 
 56. E.g., Rupert v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34–35 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 57. Id.; United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1295 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 58. Kovacs, supra note 10, at 88–89.  
 59. Id. at 66. 
 60. Id. at 73–74. 
 61. Id. at 76–77. 
 62. Id. at 77. 
 63. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 64. Kovacs, supra note 10, at 77. 











There are not enough eagles to satisfy that significant religious 
demand. Although the Fish and Wildlife Service removed the bald eagle 
from the list of threatened species in 2007, bald eagle populations are still 
at risk, and golden eagles, which are in higher demand, may be even more 
vulnerable.
65
 The Repository has a significant wait list that continues to 
grow, and the black market is thriving.
66
 “[T]he imbalance between the 
supply and demand for eagles leaves the species vulnerable and tribal 
religious needs unsatisfied.”67 
These unique circumstances led the Ninth Circuit to reason that the 
RFRA claim of a person who practices a Native American religion, but is 
not a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe, would necessarily fail 
because it would shift the religious burden, not lessen it. Leonard Antoine 
was caught selling and bartering dead eagles he had brought from Canada 
into the United States.
68
 The federal government charged him with 
violating the Eagle Act.
69
 He moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that 
the Eagle Act’s prohibitions on the possession and sale of eagles 
substantially burdened his exercise of religion in violation of RFRA.
70
 The 
district court denied that motion, and the court of appeals affirmed his 
conviction. Judge Kozinski, writing for the court, reasoned that, since the 
religious demand for eagles exceeds the supply, “every permit issued to a 
nonmember would be one fewer issued to a member. . . . [T]he burden on 
religion is inescapable; the only question is whom to burden and how 
much.”71 In other words, it’s a zero-sum game. Antoine did not seek to 
alleviate the overall burden on religion; rather, he sought to shift his 
religious burden to someone else. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that he did 
not present “a viable RFRA claim” because “an alternative can’t fairly be 
called ‘less restrictive’ if it places additional burdens on other believers.”72  
The Ninth Circuit stood its ground after the Supreme Court decided in 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal that RFRA 
required the government to exempt from the Controlled Substances Act an 
 
 
 65. Id. at 75. 
 66. Id. at 76–79. 
 67. Id. at 79. 
 68. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 923. Among the Fifth Circuit’s mistakes in its recent decision in McAllen Grace 
Brethren Church v. Salazar was thinking it necessary for the government to show that the National 
Eagle Repository would be “overwhelmed” if non-tribal members were allowed to obtain feathers. No. 
13-40326, 2014 WL 4099141 at *10 (Aug. 20, 2014). Every single feather given to a non-member is 
one fewer feather given to a tribal member. 












Amazonian religious sect’s importation of a hallucinogenic tea.73 Like 
Antoine, United States v. Vasquez-Ramos concerned Eagle Act convictions 
of individuals who are not members of federally recognized Indian tribes, 
but practice Native American religions.
74
 The defendants argued that O 
Centro undermined the holding in Antoine, but the court of appeals 
disagreed. Granting the religious exemption from the Controlled 
Substances Act in O Centro, the court reasoned, “did not have any effect 
on other people’s religion.”75 It did not present a zero-sum game. In Eagle 
Act cases, in contrast, alleviating the defendants’ burden would merely 
shift that burden to tribal members. Such a “redistribution of burdens,” the 
court held, “does not raise a valid RFRA claim.”76 
That reasoning holds true after Hobby Lobby. Whether one agrees or 
not, the Supreme Court held that exempting Hobby Lobby from the 
contraception coverage requirement would not burden the company’s 
female employees because an alternative was available that would ease the 
company’s religious burden yet still provide its employees with free 
contraception coverage. Like O Centro, Hobby Lobby did not concern a 
zero-sum game. RFRA claims in the Eagle Act context, however, 
necessarily set up a zero-sum game, because alleviating one person’s 
religious burden shifts an equal religious burden to someone else. The 
requested accommodation, therefore, is not “less restrictive” of religion 
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 77. The Department of the Interior’s recent decision to grant Eagle Act take permits for wind 
farms doesn’t change the calculus. Power-generation facilities have long caused eagle mortality. The 
Department of the Interior is trying to shift its response to this problem from ad hoc prosecutions to a 
uniform permitting system and recently granted the first Eagle Act take permit for a wind farm in 
Northern California. Phil Taylor, Obama Admin Approves First Eagle-Kill Permit for Wind Farm, 
E&E NEWS (June 26, 2014), http://www.windaction.org/posts/40713-obama-admin-approves-first-
eagle-kill-permit-for-wind-farm#.U-ppY_ldU50, archived at http://perma.cc/CUN7-KHDA. Granting 
such permits does not undermine what the courts have held is a compelling interest in protecting 
eagles, but rather “confirms . . . the strength of the government’s interest in the eagle.” United States v. 
Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 956, 959 (10th Cir. 2008). Nor do these permits indicate that the government has 
a means of pursuing its compelling interests that is less restrictive of religion. The Department of the 
Interior can only grant as many take permits as the eagle population can accommodate biologically. 16 
U.S.C. § 668a. If it gives a power company the right to take an eagle, that eagle should be turned in to 
the Repository and distributed to a tribal member. 74 Fed. Reg. 46,850, 46,853 (Sept. 11, 2009). If 
instead the Department of the Interior has to give a non-member the right to take an eagle, that eagle 
won’t go to a tribal member. It’s a zero-sum game. RFRA requires the government to ease religious 
burdens, not transfer them from person to person. 











The Eagle Act provides a stark example of a zero-sum game, because 
what is shifted from the claimant to the third party is the religious burden 
itself. Religion weighs on both sides of the scale, and there’s a one-to-one 
relationship between the burden lifted from the claimant and the burden 
imposed on the third party. In other contexts, easing one person’s religious 
burden increases someone else’s secular burden. In many of those cases, 
one might dispute whether that third-party burden is sufficiently weighty 
to defeat the requested religious accommodation.
78
 Some of those cases, 
however, present true zero-sum circumstances, like the Eagle Act, in 
which the government is involved in allocating a limited resource such 
that the religious burden eased is equal to the secular burden imposed. 
Granting the requested religious accommodation simply shifts the burden 
to a third party.  
In the anti-discrimination context, for example, religious exemptions 
can present a clear zero-sum game in situations where either the religious 
employer has to hire the covered individual or it’s exempted from that 
requirement, and someone else gets the job. As in the Eagle Act cases, in 
that type of anti-discrimination RFRA case, granting the requested 
religious accommodation shifts a burden from the claimant to a third 
party. Whether the third party’s burden is a religious burden or a secular 
burden is of no consequence, because the Establishment Clause prohibits 
the government from drawing that distinction.
79
 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning applies in any case presenting a true zero-sum game, and such 




Hobby Lobby opened the courthouse door wider for RFRA claims. 
There will be more claims for religious exemptions from laws of general 
applicability, and consequently more cases requiring the courts to decide 
when alleviating one person’s religious burden imposes too much of a 
burden on others. In the Eagle Act context, however, the courts do not 
 
 
 78. If a less restrictive alternative were not available, Hobby Lobby would fall into this category. 
 79. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“the ‘First Amendment 
mandates governmental neutrality . . . between religion and nonreligion’” (quoting Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))). 
 80. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), should not compel a different 
result. The Court there held that Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations does not violate the 
Establishment Clause, even though it imposes burdens on third parties. Id. at 337 n.15. In other words, 
the government was permitted to alleviate the religious burden Title VII imposed. The Court in Amos 
did not hold that RFRA permits a claimant to shift his religious burden onto third parties. See Gedicks, 












have to perform that balancing act. Congress carved out an exemption 
from the Eagle Act for federally recognized Indian tribes. The courts have 
upheld that exemption as a political accommodation for groups with which 
the United States has a government-to-government relationship and to 
which it owes certain fiduciary duties. Providing an exemption to people 
who are not members of federally recognized Indian tribes would not 
simply alleviate their religious burden; instead, it would shift their 
religious burden to tribal members. RFRA requires the government to 
pursue its compelling interests using the means that are least restrictive of 
religious exercise; it does not require the government to shift those 
burdens from person to person. Thus, even after Hobby Lobby, challenges 
to the Eagle Act under RFRA should continue to fail. Likewise, in other 
sorts of RFRA cases that present true zero-sum games, such as requests for 
religious exemptions from some provisions of the anti-discrimination 
laws, the Ninth Circuit’s Eagle Act jurisprudence provides the correct 
answer: the RFRA claim should fail. RFRA does not entitle claimants to 
shift their burdens onto others. 
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